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INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA: CAN THE FTAA
BE REVIVED?
Chelsea Brown1
ONCEIVED during the first Summit of the Americas Conference
in 1994, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was an
ambitious trade liberalization effort of hemispheric proportions
and a symbol of the cooperative and optimistic mindset that character-
ized the market reforms of the early nineties. Integration of the thirty-
four North and South American nations (with the exception of Cuba)
would create the world's largest single market of almost a billion people
and nearly a third of the world's GDP.2 After a flurry of preliminary
negotiations throughout the 1990s, however, talks later stalled over agri-
cultural subsidies, intellectual property rights protection, and other seem-
ingly intractable issues. The terrorist attacks in 2001 further distanced the
FTAA from the foreign policy agenda of the United States, and the 2005
deadline for completion quietly passed.
While few would quibble with the FTAA's stated mission of increasing
economic prosperity and poverty reduction, many scholars and policy-
makers now question whether free trade agreements are the best way to
accomplish these goals. This doubt helped to push the FTAA off the in-
ternational agenda and led some policy-makers to declare the idea of a
hemispheric trade agreement dead in the water. This paper examines two
general questions based on this experience: why have the FIAA negotia-
tions come to a standstill and how might negotiations be restarted? I
argue that one contributing factor in the rejection of the FTAA lies in the
social unrest and uncertainty that resulted after many countries imple-
mented structural reform policies in the 1990s. This domestic dissatisfac-
tion led to the election of protectionist governments in many nations that
1. Chelsea Brown is the John G. Tower Teaching Fellow for Political Studies at
Southern Methodist University. She received her received her Ph.D. (2008) from
the University of North Texas, holds an MBA (2002) from Texas Christian Univer-
sity, and an MSc (2002) from ESC in Dijon, France. Prior to joining SMU, she was
a visiting professor at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand,
and worked for the Foreign Agricultural Service in Moscow. Her current research
examines the effects of financial market development on human rights and civil
conflict.
2. World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK (2006), http://devdata.worldbank.
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subsequently rejected the idea of further trade liberalization. I posit that
improving domestic conditions through financial market reform may
eliminate some of the opposition to the FTAA by ultimately making it
more saleable to the population and generating domestic demand for an
agreement.
The first section of this paper provides a brief summary of the market
reforms implemented by Latin American nations and their effects. After
discussing the decision calculus underlying trade liberalization, I outline
the theoretical arguments that describe the positive relationship between
financial market development and support for trade liberalization. Pre-
liminary statistical analysis provides some supporting evidence for these
ideas, but also highlights the complexities associated with economic inter-
dependence. The final section concludes that financial market develop-
ment represents a promising method for simultaneously improving
domestic development and supporting international trade goals.
I. THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
WITH TRADE LIBERALIZATION
In response to a series of debt crises in the 1980s, policy-makers
throughout the world began looking for alternative ways to produce sus-
tainable economic development. Policy-makers noted the success of ex-
port-led growth programs in Asia and the disappointing results of the
import-substitution strategies used for decades in Latin America.
Ultimately, this culminated in a series of neo-liberal policies that em-
phasized macroeconomics and exchange rate stabilization, trade liberali-
zation, and a decreased role for the public sector. This series of market
reforms, dubbed the "Washington Consensus," was touted as a compre-
hensive panacea for Latin America's ills. 3 Many nations, either at the
insistence of international institutions or of their own accord, rushed to
implement the new policies with the hope of vigorous economic growth
and fiscal stability. The reforms, however, did not quite live up to their
expectations, and as public sentiment soured on further liberalization,
trade initiatives such as the FFAA fell victim to the gloomy atmosphere.
A. THE PROMISE OF REFORM
In the post-war period, most Latin American nations focused on im-
port-substitution as the cornerstone of their economic development poli-
cies. These policies persisted for decades but were abruptly called into
question after a series of debt crises battered the region in the 1980s. A
new approach to economic policy was clearly needed.
3. John Williamson, Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (1990)
[hereinafter Williamson, Latin American Adjustment]; John Williamson, A Short
History of the Washington Consensus, in The Washington Consensus Reconsidered
14 (N. Serra & J. Stiglitz eds., 2008) [hereinafter Williamson, A Short History of the
Washington Consensus].
CAN THE FTAA BE REVIVED?
1. Motivation for Change
While some economic growth was achieved under import-substitution
programs, the rates were low relative to similar developing nations in
Asia; a fact that did not escape the notice of policy-makers. Asia's expe-
rience provided an incentive to shift toward an export-oriented strategy
and the corresponding market reforms. The economic crises provided an
impetus for policy-makers to alter their strategy, but the enthusiasm for a
complete overhaul of Latin American economic policy was something of
a surprise. The nascent democracies in Latin America 4 were relatively
fragile and any significant shift in policy had the potential to undermine
the legitimacy of the government. The debt crises, however, were severe
enough to provide some political cover for reformist governments. 5 In
addition, democratization enfranchised much of the population that had
suffered under import-substitution programs. These groups (often rural,
agricultural communities) were supportive of the reforms and the poten-
tial for new markets.6
2. Stabilize, Liberalize and Privatize
In stark contrast to import-substitution strategies, export-led growth
strategies call for nations to develop their industries and gear production
for international rather than domestic consumption. Economic growth is
based on the idea that export-oriented production increases trade, which
in turn, circulates technology and allows countries to use their compara-
tive and competitive advantages. This growth will then allow nations to
accumulate capital and the resulting trade surplus will prevent balance of
payment deficits and result in greater economic stability and growth.7
In order to transform Latin American markets in an export-oriented
direction, a series of ten reforms were proposed. These centered around
fiscal discipline, competitive interest and exchange rates, trade and in-
vestment liberalization, deregulation and property rights protection. 8 Ec-
onomic growth and macroeconomic stability were emphasized over all
other goals since an improvement in these areas would eventually result
in improved living standards and lower poverty rates. Pithily put, "a ris-
ing tide will lift all boats."
Expectations for the reforms programs ran high. An influx of foreign
investment in manufacturing promised new jobs and technological diffu-
4. Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America,
(1994).
5. Joan M. Nelson, A Precarious Balance: Democracy and Economic Reforms in
Latin America (1994).
6. Helen V. Milner & Keiko Kubota, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and
Trade Policy in the Developing Countries, 59 Int'l Org. 107 (2005); Kurt Weyland,
The Politics of Market Reforms in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru
and Venezuela, (2003).
7. J. McCombie & A. P. Thirlwall, Economic Growth and the Balance of Payments
Constraint (1994).
8. Williamson, Latin American Adjustment, supra note 2.
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sion. The prospect of access to large new markets tantalized agricultural
producers and manufacturers alike. Proponents of free trade also
pledged that a flow of new imports would result in cheaper products that
would make life easier for the average citizen. The optimism seemed jus-
tified after NAFTA was passed in 1994, but dark clouds were gathering
on the horizon.
B. LIFE AFTER LIBERALIZATION
The exact consequences of the reforms are the subject of much debate.
Periods of economic growth were followed by a period of economic stag-
nation, and overall economic growth was lower than it had been under
the import-substitution policies. While most research suggests that
growth rates were disappointing under the Washington Consensus, 9
others have argued that growth would have been even slower without the
reforms. 10
Proponents of the Washington Consensus point to several positive ef-
fects that resulted from the reforms. Inflation was largely controlled, for-
eign investment increased, and fiscal stability was imposed. 1 On the
other hand, the anticipated improvements in employment levels and pov-
erty rates failed to materialize. There was also considerable variation in
results, with some nations benefiting substantially (Mexico), while others
(those with commodity-based exports) languished or even declined.
In nations that did experience economic growth, income inequality
soared. 12 Numerous financial crises undermined confidence in both the
government and financial institutions, as did the deterioration of educa-
tion, health, and labor standards. 13 Moreover, there was often an une-
qual distribution of benefits within national borders. In Mexico, the
northern areas were largely the beneficiaries of foreign investment and
employment in the maquiladoras, while the southern agricultural region
of Chiapas was hit hard by a flood of subsidized corn from the United
States. Not surprisingly, social unrest soon followed.
9. Jose Antonio Ocampo, Latin America's Growth and Equity Frustrations During
Structural Reforms, 18 J. Econ. Perspectives, 67 (2004).
10. William Easterly et al., Shaken and Stirred: Explaining Growth Volatility, in An-
nual World Bank Conference on Developing Economies (Bleskovic, B. and N.
Stern, eds., 2000); Nancy Birdsall & Augusto de la Torre, Commission on Eco-
nomic Reform in Unequal Latin American Societies, Washington Contentious: Ec-
onomic Policies for Social Equity in Latin America (2001).
11. Jose Salazar-Xirinachs, Economic Integration and Trade Negotiations in Latin
America and the Caribbean at the Turn of the Century, in Latin American Democ-
racies in the New Global Economy 31 (Ana Margheritis ed., 2003).
12. Paul Krugman, Inequality and Redistribution, in The Washington Consensus Re-
considered 31 (N. Serra & J. Stiglitz eds., 2008); Richard N. Cooper, Growth and
Inequality: The Role of Foreign Trade and Investment, in World Bank Conference
on Development Economics 2001/2002, (Boris Pleskovic & Nicholas Stern, eds.,
2001).
13. Ana Margheritis, Foreign Policy and Domestic Restructuring in Latin America: Re-
cent Achievements and Future Challenges, in Latin American Democracies in the
New Global Economy 1 (Ana Margheritis ed., 2003).
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Is the Washington Consensus solely to blame for Latin America's
problems? There are certainly a number of detractors that point to
problems associated with Latin America's export-oriented reforms.
Some researchers question the wisdom and efficacy of export oriented
strategies altogether.14 Others claim that its incentive structure is likely
to lead to environmental degradation. 15 However, the most consistent
criticism of the Washington Consensus reforms is that they fail to provide
a basic level of subsistence for a large portion of the population, and that
it retards democratic development and consolidation. 1 6 More specifi-
cally, the critics contend that the Washington Consensus policies tended
to minimize or undermine the institutional capacity of governments and,
thus, their ability to promote social welfare outcomes by removing the
state from economic decision making.
In the case of Latin America, the Washington Consensus' emphasis on
fiscal discipline and debt reduction meant that there was a simultaneous
decrease in social spending at a time when liberalization policies tended
to generate an even greater need for social protection. 17 When the prom-
ised economic gains did not materialize, governments were faced with a
double whammy of lower revenues and binding agreements that con-
strained their capacity to act. This further lowered social protection and
intensified the Washington Consensus backlash.
While few dispute that the reform programs did not produce the ex-
pected results, there is considerable debate as to why. First, there is some
debate about the relationship between trade and economic growth.
Given the emphasis placed on exports and trade liberalization, this dis-
pute strikes at the heart of the Washington Consensus policies. Much of
the literature supports the classical economic principle that international
trade results in greater economic growth.1 8 On the other hand, some
have argued that because free trade works on the principle of compara-
tive advantage, greater industrial specialization will occur and result in
14. Robert A. Blecker, The Diminishing Returns to Export-Led Growth, in The Bridge
to a Global Middle Class: Development, Trade, and International Finance (W. R.
Mead & S. Schmenninger eds., 2003); Robert A. Blecker, The Balance-of-Pay-
ments Constrained Growth Model and the Limits to Export-Led Growth, in A Post
Keynesian Perspective on Twenty-First Century Economic Problems, (Paul David-
son, ed., 2002); Jesus Felipe, Is Export-Led Growth Passe? Implications for Devel-
oping Asia (Asian Development Bank, Working Paper No. 48, 2003).
15. Thomas J. Biersteker, The Triumph of Liberal Economic Ideas in the Developing
World, Global Change, Regional Response 174 (Barbara Stallings ed., 1995).
16. Alan B. Krueger et al., Another Look at Whether a Rising Tide Lifts All Boats, The
Roaring 90's: Can Full Employment Be Sustained? (Alan B. Krueger & Robert M.
Solow eds., 2001); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolida-
tion, (1999); Arthur MacEwan, Neo-liberalism or Democracy?: Economic Strat-
egy, Markets and Alternatives for the 21st Century (1999).
17. Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Open-
ness Work (Overseas Development Council, Policy Essay No. 24, 1999).
18. David Dollar, World Bank, Outward Oriented Developing Economies Really Do
Grow More Rapidly: Evidence From 95 LDCs, 1976-85, 40 Econ. Dev. & Cultural
Change 523 (1992); Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-
Country Empirical Study, (1997); Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade
Cause Growth?, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 379 (1999).
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less diverse domestic economies than would otherwise occur. 19 Others
challenge the general linkage between trade and development, and reject
the notion that trade is a driver of growth.20
In other studies, selective and incomplete reforms are blamed for the
disappointing results. For example, the Washington Consensus reforms
required a competitive exchange rate, something that many nations con-
veniently ignored.21 As a result, national currencies became overvalued,
resulting in difficulties with domestic inflation and export pricing. Other
explanations for economic stagnation have focused on external events
that had little to do with structural reform policies. Debt crises in other
regions of the world, notably Russia in 1998, resulted in a sudden collapse
of capital flows into Latin America and strongly affected nations that had
a high volume of foreign denominated debt.22
Despite these alternative explanations, the Washington Consensus re-
forms are frequently held responsible for a whole variety of economic
and social ills in Latin America.23 The term itself has become synony-
mous with deteriorating living standards, special interests, and exploita-
tion of the masses.
C. CONSEQUENCES FOR TRADE
The reformist spirit of the 1990s not only engendered market reform,
but also sparked a proliferation of new trade agreements in Latin
America that promised access to new markets and foreign capital. Begin-
ning in the late 1980s, tariffs and non-tariffs barriers were sharply re-
duced. As a result, international trade in Latin America increased
significantly throughout the 1990s. Both imports and exports expanded
dramatically, as did the volume of capital flows (primarily in the form of
FDI). Manufactured and value added goods accounted for an increased
share of exports, and by the end of the century they made up the majority
of Latin American exports.24 A closer examination of these figures, how-
ever, reveals a substantial discrepancy between individual nations. Mex-
ico produces almost half of the total manufacturing exports for the
region, and actually increased its share of exports to developed countries
during the 1990s. The NAFTA in 1994 resulted in a significant amount of
manufacturing investment along the U.S. border and provided a large,
19. M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, & Marco E. Terrones, Financial Integration and
Macroeconomic Volatility (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 03/50, 2003).
20. Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skep-
tic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence, (NBER Working Paper No. 7081,
2000).
21. Williamson, Latin American Adjustment, supra note 2; Williamson, A Short His-
tory of the Washington Consensus, supra note 2.
22. Guillermo A. Calvo & Ernesto Talvi, Sudden Stop, Financial Factors, and Eco-
nomic Collapse in Latin America: Learning From Argentina and Chile, in The
Washington Consensus Reconsidered 119 (N. Serra & J. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
23. Birdsall & de la Torre, supra note 9.
24. Barbara Stallings & Wilson Peres, Growth, Employment, and Equity: The Impact
of the Economic Reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean (2000).
CAN THE FTAA BE REVIVED?
new market for these products. By contrast, most countries in the Latin
American region saw their share of exports to developed nations de-
crease throughout the reform period. Only Costa Rica and Chile exper-
ienced a slight increase in their market share, and most countries
remained dependent of primary products for export.25
NAFTA was not the only trade agreement signed in the region. Mem-
bership in regional trade agreements and the WTO also increased sub-
stantially for all countries in Latin America. Regional economic
integration was facilitated through increased membership in organiza-
tions such as the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, and most recently
CAFTA.26 In fact, intra-MERCOSUR trade alone accounted for 20 per-
cent of the group's international trade by 1998.27 In addition to these
regional agreements, over ten trade agreements were concluded with na-
tions outside Latin America and several more are still in negotiations. 28
D. THE FTAA
The successful 1994 passage of NAFTA resulted in fresh enthusiasm for
free trade agreements. The FTAA's Declaration of Principles reflects the
prevailing optimism of the time by stating that the "key to prosperity is
trade without barriers .... ",29 Work toward the FTAA progressed
throughout the 1990s and even culminated in an initial draft agreement in
2001. Soon afterwards, however, enthusiasm for the agreement began to
sharply wane. The last official meeting for the FTAA member countries
was held in 2003, and no formal talks have been held since.
1. Potential Benefits of the FTAA
In addition to the usual benefits of market access, foreign investment,
and technology transfer discussed earlier, free trade agreements can pro-
vide other advantages to member nations. Signing a FTA effectively
removes liberalization from the domestic agenda, and conveys a nation's
dedication to market principles. This can mollify jittery financial markets
about the investment environment, and ultimately encourage additional
business development. 30 At the same time, many of the FITAA member
nations have joined the WTO or are in negotiations to do so. While the
FTAA would provide for greater trade liberalization than the WTO
prescribes, there are questions about the need for, and implementation
costs associated with, multiple agreements.
25. Source: ECLAC.
26. See J. Salazar-Xirinachs, J. Manuel & E. Lizano, Free Trade in the Americas: A
Latin American Perspective, in The Premise and the Promise: Free Trade in the
Americas (S. Saborio, ed., 1992).
27. Stallings & Peres, supra note 23.
28. Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 10.
29. Free Trade Area of The Americas, First Summit of the Americas: Declaration of
Miami, Dec. 9-11, 1994, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Summits/Miami/declarae.asp.
30. Jose Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs, The FTAA Process: From Miami 1994 to Quebec
2001, in Toward Free Trade in the Americas 279 (Jose Salazar & Maryse Robert
eds., 2001).
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2. Sources of Conflict
Other disagreements in a few key subject areas have largely been re-
sponsible for the derailing of the FTAA. Concerns over intellectual prop-
erty rights and agricultural subsidies form the bulk of the conflict and
have yet to be resolved. More recently, heated political rhetoric from the
Bolivian and Venezuelan presidents has further fueled the debate about
the potential benefits of the agreement, and contributed to popular oppo-
sition to free trade agreements in those countries.
Not surprisingly, resistance to the FFAA is greatest in the
MERCOSUR member nations who are heavily dependent on agricul-
tural production. 31 While there is a natural comparative advantage for
agriculture in many of these nations, U.S. subsidies of agricultural prod-
ucts effectively eliminate any potential gains from trade. Many nations
have also experienced problems with asymmetrical liberalization in which
Latin American openness was not matched in other markets. Uncer-
tainty regarding the true level of market access in other nations has gen-
erated doubts about the ability of the FTAA to provide meaningful
economic opportunities. Recent policies in the largest FTAA market, the
United States, have not helped matters. The 2002 protectionist policies
regarding steel imports provided ample evidence that the United States
would resort to protectionist policies if its interests were threatened.
Concerns over intellectual property rights protection constitute the
other major stumbling block to an agreement. In this case, the United
States and other wealthy countries want stronger enforcement for pat-
ents, and compliance with the WTO's Agreement on Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Intellectual property
rights protection tends to disproportionately benefit wealthier nations
since they are usually the source of the protected material. Lower in-
come nations argue that a strict adherence to this agreement imposes un-
necessary costs on developing nations (the higher costs of providing
pharmaceutical drugs, for instance) and further reduces the expected eco-
nomic benefits of the FTAA.
E. SUMMARY OF LATIN AMERICAN REFORM PROGRAMS
In retrospect, the Washington Consensus reform programs in Latin
America promised too much and delivered too little. Since the reform
packages were sold to the public as a magic cure for the regions econom-
ics ailments, it is not surprising that the results did not meet the inflated
expectations. While some macroeconomic goals, such as control of infla-
tion, were met, economic conditions for many segments of the population
worsened and the backlash against market reform gained traction.
31. Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy of Pro-
tection in Brazil since 1987, (Special Initiative on Trade & Integration, Working
Paper 08B, 2004).
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The negative economic and social climate was naturally a focus for do-
mestic politics, and by the late 1990s, opposition politicians seized on the
Washington Consensus as the source of Latin America's problems. As
trade liberalization usually occurred in conjunction with other structural
reforms, there was a strong association between trade agreements and the
negative effects from the Washington Consensus. 32 The subsequent elec-
tion of leftist governments in Bolivia and Venezuela, often on an anti-
liberalization platform, meant that there was little support among policy-
makers for new trade agreements. While some support for the agreement
remains, 33 the FTAA has largely been removed from the public agenda of
many member nations. The next section of this paper more closely exam-
ines the way in which policy-makers determine their priorities and then
suggests how this decision calculus might be altered.
II. DECIDING ON FREE TRADE - THEORIES OF
DOMESTIC DECISION MAKING
Popular wisdom holds that the main goal of any politician is re-elec-
tion, and Latin America is no exception to this rule. The presence of
multiple veto players in the form of opposing interests requires every pol-
itician to make a calculation of the potential gains from a policy minus
the potential cost.34 Various social, economic and political costs are
weighed in the decision making process. Further complicating the inter-
national trade picture, preferences and reactions of other nations must
also be considered. When the policy in question involves international
negotiation, differing preferences between nations can obscure the do-
mestic debate that simultaneously exists. In 1988 Putnam termed this a
two-level bargaining game in which players must satisfy diverse domestic
interests while simultaneously negotiating for the best policy outcome in
the international arena.35
A. CALCULATION OF POTENTIAL GAINS AND POTENTIAL COSTS
Trade negotiation, like any other policy area, is inherently a political
question, and trade agreements increasingly span a wide variety of con-
cerns. Thus, support for any trade policy requires a decision calculus that
considers the consequences for various groups in conjunction with their
degree of political mobilization.
At the domestic level, trade liberalization often creates uneven benefits
across the population and can be a powerful source of cleavages within
32. Maria Victoria Murillo, Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reform in
Latin America (2001).
33. Andy Baker, Why Is Trade Reform So Popular in Latin America?: A Consump-
tion-Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences, 55 World Pols. 423 (contending that
there is still considerable support for trade liberalization in spite of the difficulties
associated with reform).
34. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (2002).
35. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level
Games, 43 Int'l Org. 427 (1988).
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the electorate. 36 Previous research links higher trade integration with in-
creased exposure to global business cycles and risk. 37 This means that
greater trade openness increases the need for social insurance programs
and the means to pay for them. Businesses with a large share of the do-
mestic market often stand to lose under more competitive conditions and
will lobby (very often with preferential access to policy-makers) for pro-
tectionist policies. In addition, the cost of compliance with customs, sani-
tary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements, and intellectual property
rights regulations required under an FTA may be very high for some in-
dustry segments, again potentially negating any benefits from increased
trade activity.38 On the other hand, export-oriented industries and cer-
tain groups within society are well positioned to reap the benefits of trade
openness. Unfortunately for pro-trade politicians, however, the potential
beneficiaries of an F-IA are far less likely to mobilize than those who
markets and livelihoods are threatened by greater openness.
At the international level, substantial negotiation and bargaining asym-
metries exist between the FTAA member countries and create their own
policy cleavages. The FTAA is unique in that it encompasses nations
with a huge range of economic development, trade priorities, and re-
source endowments. Just four of the thirty-four countries (Brazil, Ca-
nada, Mexico, and the United States) account for almost 90 percent of
the GNI in the FTAA.39 This diversity results in a plethora of policy
priorities and variation in commitment levels. Countries such as Mexico
have more diversified economies, and a lack of international competitive-
ness in one sector may be offset by a substantial comparative advantage
in another. Others, such as Guatemala and Paraguay, are heavily depen-
dent on one industry or export market and lack the infrastructure to ben-
efit from the agreement.
Not surprisingly, many of the smaller nations are fearful that the larger
nations have a disproportionate say in the negotiations, and could dictate
both the scope and the terms of the FTAA. Agriculture in particular has
been a sticking point in negotiations, as agriculturally dependent nations
will not realize any benefits from trade without a substantial reform to
U.S. agricultural subsidies. For the smaller nations whose wellbeing de-
pends heavily on reciprocal market access, the ability to negotiate an
agreement on items such as non-tariff barriers is paramount. There is
36. Hyeok Yong Kwon, Has Economic Insecurity Produced Left Voters? A Markov
Chain Approach, Presentation at the Ninety-ninth Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Political Science Association (Sept. 15, 2003) (linking economic insecurity with
increased demand for social services and a preference for leftish political parties).
37. Dani Rodrik, Why Do Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?, 106 J. Pol.
Econ. 997 (1998).
38. See J. Michael Finger, Implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements: Problems for
Developing Countries, 24 World Econ. 1097 (2001); J. Michael Finger & Philip
Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: the Development Chal-
lenge (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2215, 1999) (discussing estimated costs
associated with WTO compliance).
39. World Development Indicators, supra note 1.
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also the perception that the FTAA amounts to a new form of colonialism,
and that the FTAA will result in a greater reliance on foreign (mostly
U.S.) capital and products to the detriment of domestic interests. In this
case, the costs of participation in the FTAA may exceed the potential
benefits.
Alternatively, membership in the FTAA may provide both economic
and political benefits. While substantial disagreement persists on the ex-
act effects, the FTAA is likely to benefit the real GDP of nations, particu-
larly in the MERCOSUR countries. Monteagudo and Watanuki
calculate an overall GDP increase of 0.5 percent for the overall FTAA
and a 2.2 percent increase for the agriculturally dependent MERCOSUR
countries. They concede, however, that there is still a perceptible varia-
tion in expected benefits between nations.40 Further, an exclusionary
policy on the FTAA may be costly in foreign policy terms. The United
States as well as other countries often link military and foreign aid to
particular policy actions, and non-participation in a hemispheric trade
agreement may signal a lack of commitment to market reform that deters
foreign investment.
Other external concerns also play a role in the decision calculus of pol-
icy-makers. Recent concerns about re-nationalization of private compa-
nies in Venezuela and terrorism concerns in the United States have
pushed trade agreements to the bottom of the foreign policy agenda in
many nations. Adding to both the domestic and international compo-
nents of the equation, something of a time asymmetry may confront pol-
icy-makers. Politicians are often faced with election challenges well
before the benefits from trade are likely to be realized. In many cases,
long-term benefits and short-term elections do not add up to a winning
combination.
B. VOLATILITY-JUsT How CERTAIN ARE THOSE ESTIMATES?
Anyone familiar with data analysis knows that the certainty of any out-
come is a reflection of the information used to make those predictions.
Instability in the political or economic environment generates a level of
uncertainty about the reliability of the costs and benefits of a particular
policy. Prospect theory suggests that under conditions of uncertainty,
policy-makers will fear potential losses from an agreement more than
they will covet potential gains. 41 Thus, they will behave with greater cau-
40. Josefina Monteagudo & Masakazu Watanuki, Regional Trade Agreements for
Mercosur: A Comparison Between the FTAA and the FTA with the European
Union, 94 Economie internationale 53 (2003).
41. Jeffrey Berejikian, The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
789 (1997). For further examples of the economic applications of this theory, see
also Rodrik, supra note 16; Dennis P. Quinn & John T. Woolley, Democracy and
National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
634 (2001).
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tion where new trade agreements are concerned. 42 Conversely, more cer-
tain economic and political environments create greater confidence in the
decision calculus and policy-makers may feel more confident in pursuing
potentially controversial agreements.
C. DECISIONS, DECISIONS-THREE POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
As democratic governance requires politicians to take voter prefer-
ences into account, this leaves trade policy-makers with three basic pol-
icy options to ensure their hold on power: liberalize trade and
compensate the losing groups (usually through some redistribution
scheme), liberalize trade and exclude the losing groups from the political
process, or avoid trade liberalization altogether. 43
Needless to say, there are problems with all three of these options in a
democracy. This is further complicated by the relatively nascent nature
of many Latin American democracies. Increased taxes for redistribution
schemes benefit some groups, but are opposed by those who stand to gain
the most from trade. The benefits from free trade might not offset the tax
cost to these groups.
One alternative, excluding losing groups from the political process, is
inherently undemocratic. While this is potentially an effective solution, it
is ultimately undesirable. The resulting democratic deficit is not likely to
be well received by the international and domestic community, and may
provoke additional social conflict. There may also be economic conse-
quences of an exclusionary policy, such as economic sanctions and declin-
ing international investment flows. There is also potential for damage to
regional relationships, and exclusion could be costly in foreign policy, is-
sue-linked areas.
If the political costs are high enough, or in times of political and eco-
nomic uncertainty, then any new agreements are likely to be pushed to
the back of the policy agenda, and the negotiation process stalls. Thus,
the third option is simply to maintain the status quo and forego any new
agreements.
III. OVERCOMING DOMESTIC OBJECTIONS TO THE FTAA
If, as is the case with the FTAA, the third option is chosen and negotia-
tions come to a halt, how can the process be revived? Trade negotiations
proceed more smoothly if policy-makers have a domestic mandate for
free trade. Improving the socio-economic conditions that are negatively
associated with liberalization can help create popular support for an
agreement. 44 Financial market development-by reducing poverty, de-
42. E. Mansfield & E. Reinhardt, International Institutions and the Volatility of Inter-
national Trade, Int'l Org. (2007) (forthcoming).
43. Alicia Asdera & Caries Boix, Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector:
The Political Underpinnings of Openness, 56 Int'l Org. 229 (2002).
44. Matthew Gabel & Harvey D. Palmer, Understanding Variation in Public Support
for European Integration, 27 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 3 (2006).
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creasing income inequality, improving corruption and governmental ef-
fectiveness, and stimulating overall economic growth-may work to
create a political environment that is conducive to trade policy reform.
Financial market development may also increase the competitiveness of
domestic industry and reduce the economic volatility that is associated
with open markets. In short, financial market development addresses
some of the sources of potential conflict, and may make trade negotiation
a feasible option for politicians.
A. IMPROVE THE DOMESTIC FOUNDATION
Both living standards and perceived quality of governance exert a
strong effect on voters' policy preferences. Policies that promote socio-
economic development and institutional improvements remove some of
the economic uncertainty associated with liberalization and generate trust
in government policies and programs. Financial markets may foster this
development by acting as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs, re-
moving uncertainty, and increasing the amount of available informa-
tion.45 Government institutions may then be able to use this information
to better allocate resources in a manner that more effectively responds to
the needs of the population. 46
1. Better Socio-economic Conditions
Financial market development is hypothesized to improve economic
growth in a nation by allocating resources more efficiently than would be
the case in their absence.47 They do this by spreading risk, allowing in-
vestment in larger, higher return projects, eliminating information asym-
metries, and providing capital to the most competitive, highest-returning
projects regardless of individual or firm connections. 48 In high-income
nations, financial market development is expected to increase the produc-
tivity of capital, while in lower income nations financial market develop-
ment should boost capital accumulation and mobilization of savings. 49
Financial market development may reduce poverty by boosting overall
economic growth, and changing the distribution of income within soci-
ety.50 Credit constraints and lack of political connections are especially
45. Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, in Handbook of Eco-
nomic Growth 865 (P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf eds. 2005).
46. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. Pol. Econ. 949
(2005).
47. See Ronald I. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development (1973);
Edward S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development (1973); Robert
G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 108 Q.
J. Econ. 717 (1993); Valerie R. Bencivenga et al., Transaction Costs. Technological
Change, and Endogenous Growth, 67 J. Econ. Theory 153 (1995).
48. Thorsten Beck et al., Financial and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size
Matter?, 60 J. Fin. 137 (2005) [hereinafter Beck and Kunt].
49. Patrick Bolton & Phillipe Aghion, A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Devel-
opment, 64 Rev. Econ. Stud. 151 (1997).
50. Patrick Honohan, Financial Development, Growth and Poverty: How Close are the
Links? 1-31 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 3203, 2004).
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binding on lower income groups, and low income savings are often inade-
quate to fund high-return investments such as education and business en-
trepreneurship. 51 A developed financial market provides better access to
credit and market information, meaning that those without collateral or
connections can be judged on the quality of their projects. Finally, better
financial markets may provide a check on monopolistic companies, and
provide better services at more competitive rates. 52
The theory behind decreasing inequality is related to the arguments for
poverty reduction. Financial market development changes the income
distribution in a nation by providing access to capital for lower income
groups to invest in education and engage in entrepreneurial activities. 53
Access to credit also allows for income smoothing and prevents the
deeply discounted sale of assets during periods of economic hardship.54
Moreover, these effects disproportionately benefit the lower income
groups in a nation.55 While some research stands in opposition to these
arguments, the majority of empirical studies uphold these relationships. 56
2. More Transparent and Responsive Institutions
In addition to the promotion of economic growth and poverty reduc-
tion, financial market development may further affect the domestic envi-
ronment by reducing corruption and generating the demand for more
effective government institutions. Good financial markets may affect cor-
ruption by lowering transaction costs and reducing uncertainty about the
risk of a particular project, thereby eliminating some of the incentive for
corrupt behavior.57 Individuals seeking investment capital will not be
tempted to bribe or deal with corrupt officials for access to capital if, for
example, efficient financial markets exist. 58 Well developed financial
markets also embody a degree of accountability and transparency in
which corrupt activities are easier to detect and punish. By removing the
51. Abhijit Banerjee & Andrew Newman, Occupational Choice and the Process of De-
velopment, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 274 (1993); Thorsten Beck et al., Finance, Inequality,
and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper
No. 10979, 2004)
52. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists
(2003).
53. Jose De Gregorio, Borrowing Constraints, Human Capital Accumulation, and
Growth, 37 J. Monetary Econ. 49 (1996).
54. Sumru Altug & Robert A. Miller, Household Choices in Equilibrium, 58
Econometrica 543 (1990); Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, Saving, Growth, and
Liquidity Constraints, 109 Q. J. Econ. 83 (1994).
55. Inessa Love, World Bank, Financial Development and Financial Constraint: Inter-
national Evidence from the Structural Investment Model, 16 Rev. Fin. Stud. 765
(2003); Beck and Kunt, supra note 47.
56. Robert Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. Monetary
Econ. 3 (1988); Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Development: A Survey, 99
Econ. J. 597 (1989).
57. John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role
of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 295 (2004).
58. Hilton Root, & Nahalel Nellis, The Compulsion of Patronage: Political Sources of
Information Asymmetry and Risk in Developing Country Economies, in Governing
for Prosperity (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root eds., 2000).
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incentive for cheating by both supplier and consumer, financial markets
may reduce the level of corruption within a nation.
Financial market development also creates a stronger middle class with
an interest in developing government institutions that reflect their needs.
High quality government institutions transform societal demands into im-
plemented policies that address those demands in a timely manner. 59
When a greater proportion of the population is brought into the eco-
nomic mainstream, they then have a stake in government activity. 60 The
increased demands, particularly in a democratic government, are more
representative of the needs of the population as a whole.
In this way, financial markets not only decrease the opportunities for
corruption and inefficiency, they create a stimulus for change in institu-
tions to make them more responsive to society. This, combined with the
improvements in resource allocation, can create a virtuous cycle where
the middle classes are being reinforced by the opportunities offered by
good markets, demand causes changes in the political institutions, and
those institutions reinforce the financial system by providing a solid envi-
ronment for the market to flourish.
B. READY THE MARKET FOR GLOBAL COMPETITION
Better financial market development creates a more efficient allocation
of resources for both public goods and private capital. Increased demand
for large-scale infrastructure projects, combined with lower potential for
corruption during the development of these projects, enhances the ability
of producers to get their products to market. Better investment alloca-
tion also means that private capital is shifted to the projects and busi-
nesses with the greatest potential for returns. This tends to generate
products that have a high market value rather than projects that are
funded as a result of political connections or political preferences. Strong
domestic financial systems further diversify risk among a large pool of
investors, and investment in new technologies is facilitated. Along with
the lower cost of capital that results from more efficient markets, new
technologies may allow domestic businesses to profitably produce prod-
ucts that are competitive on the global market. Because more efficient
capital allocation results in greater competition among firms to generate
high returns, there is an extra incentive for companies to implement in-
ternational best practices and build industry expertise. Over time, this
may help eliminate fears of invasive foreign competition and the desire
for new markets may even generate additional support for trade
liberalization.
59. Philip Keefer, A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: From Property
Rights to Voice (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 3315, 2004).
60. Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992).
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C. REDUCE THE VOLATILITY ASSOCIATED WITH TRADE OPENNESS
In the case of a nation participating in the global financial system, insti-
tutions are the first barrier, or first structure that the capital (currency,
trade, or otherwise) encounters. In a sense, the structure of public and
private financial institutions acts as a filtering mechanism for global capi-
tal flows into, out of, and within a nation. Global capital flows usually
take the form of currency and direct investment. Since this form of capi-
tal travels through financial intermediaries, the internal structure of a na-
tion's financial market development plays a crucial role in buffering the
domestic system from shocks.
More specifically, financial market development may help protect a na-
tion from the volatility associated with global financial flows by creating
markets that are more local in nature and by providing additional layers
in the financial market system to absorb these shocks. 61 Strong local
markets provide more stable sources of domestic finance and can insulate
against global capital flows. 62 With a higher number of market partici-
pants, risk is more diversified, which can lower the cost of credit, resulting
in economic growth.63 As financial depth increases, risk mitigation and
hedging are also easier because there is a wider variety of tools to work
with. Thus, volatility in the system is easier to manage and the risk of
speculative capital flight and financial crisis is potentially lessened.
D. IMPROVE THE DOMESTIC PERCEPTION OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Globalization and economic openness generally increase the insecurity
of a population, generating an automatic distrust of any new trade agree-
ment.64 The improvements in socio-economic conditions and institu-
tional structure all work to reassure the population that trade
liberalization will not result in a decline in their standard of living. Lower
socio-economic groups benefit from the decreased volatility and im-
proved economic conditions, and thus may be more confident about their
61. Rodrik is careful to note that volatility comes from exposure to risk, and is not
automatically the result of economic openness. Rodrik, supra note 37. As such,
there is often substantial variation in the risk profile for each country, even under
the same trade agreement.
62. The empirical findings on the relationship between economic openness and volatil-
ity are not conclusive. Fagerberg and Rodrik, among others, find that exposure to
a larger market results in less risk, while Easterly conversely reports that increased
openness results in greater volatility. Jan Fagerberg, Technology and International
Differences in Growth Rates 32 J. Econ. Literature, 1147 (1994); Dani Rodrik, Has
Globalization Gone Too Far? (1997); William Easterly et al., supra note 9. More
recently, Brunner concluded that there is no explicit relationship between the two,
and that other factors besides economic openness explain volatility. Allan D.
Brunner & Kanda Naknoi, Trade Costs, Market Integration, and Macroeconomic
Volatility (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 54, 2003).
63. Kose notes that a baseline level of economic and market development is required
before these benefits are realized. Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, supra note 18.
64. Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, What Determines Individual Trade-
Policy Preferences?, 54 J. Int'l Econ. 267 (2001); Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J.
Slaughter, Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production, 48 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 662 (2004).
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survival under a more liberal trade regime. Better financial market de-
velopment may also more evenly distribute the benefits of trade, poten-
tially eliminating some of the disenfranchisement that leads to opposition
and protest. Generating trust in government through lower corruption
and greater effectiveness also works to reassure the population that their
concerns will be addressed. Perhaps most importantly for policy-makers,
the improved allocation of resources that results from financial sector de-
velopment means that benefits are experienced faster, thus cementing
popular support and allowing political commitment to further trade
liberalization.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SHOWING FINANCIAL
MARKET DEVELOPMENT'S EFFECTS
ON DOMESTIC CONDITIONS
To test these ideas, data from thirty-two Latin American countries
were collected each year from 1975-2003. This data was then analyzed
using multiple statistical estimators to examine the effects of financial
market development on domestic conditions in Latin America over time.
A. THE DATA
The following analysis examines the effects of financial market devel-
opment on overall GDP growth rates, the change in GDP per capita,
65
the poverty rate, income inequality, government corruption, and the per-
ceived levels of governmental effectiveness. 66 The level of democracy,
foreign direct investment levels (FDI), inflation, national debt levels,
trade flows, and population size are included as controls in the model to
ensure that the results reflect only the effects of financial market develop-
ment, and are not a consequence of some other phenomena. 67 The basic
operationalization and source for each variable are provided in Appendix
A. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
65. Overall GDP growth is used as a control variable in the regressions on poverty,
inequality, corruption, and governmental effectiveness.
66. Woodruff provides a nice summary of the issues surrounding institutional mea-
surement. Christopher Woodruff, Measuring Institutions, in International Hand-
book on the Economics of Corruption 105 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006).
67. Rousseau and Wachtel find that the effects of financial market development are
much weaker in high inflation environments. P. L. Rousseau & P. Wachtel, Equity
Markets and Growth: Cross-Country Evidence on Timing and Outcomes, 1980-
1995, 24 J. Banking & Fin. 1933 (2000). Thus, it is included as a control. FDI and
trade volume are also included as these factors have been identified as drivers of
economic growth. Though the two may have a similar action mechanism, there is a
sufficiently small correlation (r=0.34) to warrant the inclusion of both.
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev Min Max
Private Credit 887 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.97
GDP Growth 1045 1.37 4.80 -28.73 23.08
GDP per capita 1040 3394.17 2791.36 437.00 16022.00
Inequality 341 50.74 6.13 32.90 60.68
Poverty 336 25.72 16.45 2.00 79.94
Corruption 207 -0.17 0.60 -1.70 1.55
Effectiveness 219 -0.17 0.58 -1.56 1.40
Level of Democracy 764 51.18 38.20 0.00 100
FDI 748 1.95 3.13 -19.78 39.92
Inflation 709 123.85 777.49 -11.45 11749.64
Debt 93 44.08 36.92 11.24 190.08
Trade 744 59.58 38.49 10.34 280.36
Population (ln) 782 15.81 1.25 13.47 19.01
B. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The data were combined into a panel dataset and analyzed using a dy-
namic panel data estimator as well as a panel corrected standard error
(PCSE) estimator for cross-sectional time-series data.68 Since inferences
from panel data are sensitive to model specification, both estimators were
used to ensure the reliability of results. 69 Diagnostic tests on the vari-
ables revealed the presence of a unit root in the financial market develop-
ment measure. 70 Consequently, all tests are conducted using the
differenced value of this indicator. The poverty, inequality, corruption,
and effectiveness measures did not exhibit trends and are considered sta-
tionary. GDP growth and the change in GDP per capita are differenced
by definition and stationary.
Theoretically, we expect there to be some simultaneity between politi-
cal and financial market development. While some research has substan-
tiated the idea that financial development primarily precedes economic
and political development, there is little doubt that the reverse is also true
as economic and fiscal policy certainly has an effect on financial market
development. In addition, unobserved factors (such as trust) that have
effects on both political development and financial market development
may be present. To account for the possible endogeneity resulting from
these conditions, a system GMM estimator developed by Blundell and
Bond was used, 71 which considers the potential for simultaneous interac-
68. Nathaniel Beck & Jonathan N. Katz, What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series
Cross-Section Data, 89 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 634 (1995); Nathaniel Beck and
Jonathan N. Katz, Time Series Cross-Section Issues: Dynamics 2004, in Annual
Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology (2004) [hereinafter Beck & Katz,
Time Series Cross-Section Issues].
69. Stata Version 10.0 is used for all estimations.
70. Kyung S. Im, M. Hashem Pesaran, & Yongcheol Shin, Testing for Unit Roots in
Heterogeneous Panels, 115 J. Econometrics 53 (2003).
71. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data:
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, 58 Rev.
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tion between the dependent and independent variables. 72 A lag on the
dependent variable is also included to account for autocorrelation within
the model.73
The concurrent value of the financial market development indicator
was also used, along with a forward of five, ten, and fifteen years. Using
multiple time periods may allow for the elucidation of the longer run ef-
fects of financial market development. The five, ten, and fifteen year pe-
riods are selected to allow enough time for any effects to appear, but are
short enough to capture the dynamics of the effect. Theoretically this is
appropriate because the effects of financial market development are not
expected to appear instantaneously.
Table 2 shows a summary of the results from the panel data tests. The
columns display the coefficients on financial market development for
each of the four time periods tested (the contemporaneous regression,
and estimates of the effects with the dependent variable with five, ten and
fifteen year leads). The dependent variable for the regression is listed by
row. Thus, each value represents a separate regression.
TABLE 2: EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT
ON INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS IN LATIN AMERICA
Coefficients for Private Credit
Dependent Variable Concurrent 5 years 10 years 15 years
GDP Per Capita -1659.00*** 256.30 -0.37 1042.00***
GDP Growth -33.99*** 5.26 2.59 16.77**
Poverty Levels -4.94 11.49*** -6.12"* -21.42***
Inequality -4.37 5.07 4.65 1.76
Corruption 1.08* -0.91 1.53*** 0.03
Effectiveness 2.36*** 1.41 1.39* 0.07
***p<O.01, ** p<O.05, * p<o.l
Contrary to expectations, financial market development has a negative
effect on the economic indicators at the outset, but over time the effects
become positive. Initially, an increase in credit significantly decreases
GDP per capita and overall GDP growth. After fifteen years, however,
the effect reverses itself, and an increase in financial market development
has a positive impact on both overall GDP growth and per capita income.
Increased credit exacerbates poverty levels after five years, but then sig-
nificantly lowers the poverty rate at the ten and fifteen year marks. Fur-
Econ. Stud. 277 (1991); Richard Blundell & Stephen Bond, Initial Conditions and
Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models, 87 J. Econometrics 115
(1998).
72. Population is treated as exogenous in the model, while the democracy, IMF reform
measures, GDP growth, FDI, trade, unemployment, and inflation are all consid-
ered at least partially endogenous. One-step estimation, and a maximum of two
lags are specified for the instruments in the GMM estimation. The pair wise op-
tion is specified in the PCSE models.
73. Beck & Katz, Time Series Cross-Section Issues, supra note 67.
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ther, the coefficient goes from (-6.1) in year ten to (-21.42) in year fifteen,
indicating that the positive effects of credit increase over time.
Inequality levels in Latin America, as a whole, are not significantly af-
fected by a change in private credit, a finding that does not support the
above theory. Given the variation in development levels across the sam-
ple, however, the lack of significance in the inequality measure should not
be an invitation to dismiss this concern. A quick examination of the indi-
vidual country results show that financial market development affects in-
come inequality significantly, but that the direction of the effects vary.
This suggests that the collective results may be masking trends that would
be apparent if the sample were constrained according to other national
characteristics.
Interestingly, corruption levels within Latin America are improved
with an increase in the level of financial market development. The effects
are significant both at the outset, and after ten years. Increased private
credit could reduce the immediate need for bribery on the part of credit
recipients, while the long-term reduction reflects the greater market
transparency and accountability that makes corruption a less attractive
option for would-be suppliers.
Governmental effectiveness is also positively affected by an increase in
private credit after ten years and at the time of the initial increase in
private credit. The diversity of countries within the region may again pro-
vide an explanation for these results. In low-income countries, institu-
tions are usually in their infancy. The inherent instability associated with
relatively new governments (and often weak legitimacy) may explain why
improvements in governmental effectiveness can take several years. It
takes time for a population to accept a government system, learn how it
works, and feel that it is responding to the needs of society. The middle-
income nations, by contrast, may already have some of the initial skepti-
cism removed, and the population may perceive improvements in effec-
tiveness much more readily. For the highest income category with a fairly
high level of financial market development, it simply may take more time
for the effects to filter down and translate into improved effectiveness
ratings.
Few of the control variables are significant in any of the regression
models. Debt and inflation exert a slightly negative effect on economic
growth, poverty, inequality, and government effectiveness, but the small
magnitude of the effects renders them substantively meaningless.74 In-
creased FDI was marginally associated with decreasing poverty and cor-
ruption, and an increase in economic growth. The population size, level
of democracy, and trade volume did not show a significant effect on any
of the dependent variables.
74. Unfortunately, the data on government debt is relatively scarce. Better data could
provide more illumination on the effects of this variable, particularly in the debt-
crisis laden region of Latin America.
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These findings lend support to the hypothesis that financial market de-
velopment may result in improved domestic conditions that are condu-
cive not only to the signing of a trade agreement, but also set the stage to
ensure that the benefits are maximized when trade does occur, further
reinforcing support for such agreements.
V. NO SOLUTION IS PERFECT
Many have noted that trade policy is rife with complicated issues and
linkages, and that no magic solution exists to solve all of the problems
associated with this interdependence. Addressing the often substantial
financial deficiencies of individual nations is a difficult process, and it can
be several years before noticeable improvement occurs. In some in-
stances, socio-economic conditions may initially decline before an im-
provement is noted. When these needs are combined with the limited
timetable of trade negotiations, the time span needed for financial sector
development can present a potential pitfall for this approach. The need
for government compensation programs to offset the economic concerns
(and political weight) of disadvantaged groups may also require unsus-
tainable levels of government spending. Finally, the effects of other geo-
political concerns cannot be understated, and may present serious
complications to trade negotiations.
A. FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
In comparison to other regions, the level of financial market develop-
ment in Latin America is relatively low. The variety of financial institu-
tions is limited, and bond and derivatives markets are lagging relative to
other peer regions. 75 In addition, the legal and contract environment are
weak, and laws in several nations offer debtors ways to limit collection.76
Consumers in nations with a history of banking crises, such as Argentina,
have a lingering (and often justified) mistrust of domestic banks that hin-
ders financial sector development in these countries. When businesses in
these nations have the ability to finance internationally, they do so more
often in Latin America than in other regions that have experienced simi-
lar crises. This undermines the domestic market by removing the larger
(and, if they can find foreign financing, less risky) companies from the
investor pool. As a result, smaller domestic companies have very limited
access to credit, and a smaller, weaker pool of potential investors.
Encouragingly, not all Latin American countries fit this description,
and considerable variation exists within the region. Brazil and Chile have
some of the most sophisticated derivatives markets in the world. Chile
75. Augusto de la Torre & Sergio L. Schmukler, Emerging Capital Markets and
Globalization: The Latin American Experience (2007). See also Atilano J. Padilla
& Alejandro Requejo, The Costs and Benefits of the Strict Protection of Creditor
Rights: Theory and Evidence, in Defusing Default (Marco Pagano, ed., 2001).
76. Armando C. Pinheiro & Celia Cabral, Mercado de Credito no Brasil: o Papel do
Judiciario e de Outras Instituicoes (Ensaios BNDES, Working Paper No. 9, 1998).
2009]
242 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
has made substantial progress in encouraging long-term investment by
developing new mutual funds and specialized pension funds. Even with
these advances, however, the region still struggles with overall financial
development. 77 As a result, the positive consequences for trade liberali-
zation may not be fully realized.
B. INITIAL DETERIORATION OF SocIo-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Perhaps of greater concern to policy-makers seeking re-election, both
this statistical analysis and historical observation illustrate the fact that
changes in the financial sector often result in a short-term decline in
socio-economic indicators. There are several explanations for these ef-
fects, but none are likely to soothe the concerns of voters who may asso-
ciate the decline with market liberalization or economic openness.
First, the increase in credit may fund business ventures that take some
time before a substantial return is generated. During this period, there
may be a slight contraction in overall economic growth as inefficient and
low-return businesses are weeded out. While this slackening of the econ-
omy is eventually reversed by higher productivity and efficiency, the tran-
sition may take several years in countries where outdated modes of
production are prevalent.
In addition, the use of credit may differ across countries, and result in
divergent economic outcomes. In lower income nations, the initial credit
funds may be used to finance the basic infrastructure for the economy.
The subsequent economic returns and corresponding reduction in pov-
erty are not realized until this infrastructure is in place. For higher in-
come nations, the use of credit occurs largely in the consumer credit
sector rather than basic business investment. In many markets, these new
financial products are introduced to a population with a relatively low
level of financial education. The targeted population may not fully un-
derstand the implications of credit, take out loans that they are unable or
unwilling to pay back, and suffer an economic decline as a result. This
results in a short-term spike in poverty levels, but this effect is mitigated
as the broader benefits to financial market development occur. Income
inequality may also be exacerbated by an increase in private credit. In
the case of many Latin American nations, banking access is limited, and
an initial increase in private credit may only be accessible to a limited
segment of the population. Thus, there may be a short-term expansion of
the income inequality as the more elite members of society take advan-
tage of the influx of credit. As the financial sector grows, access expands
to include a greater proportion of society, and the income gap narrows.
Changes in this indicator may take longer than other socio-economic in-
dicators as the returns on high-yield investments such as education typi-
cally require a generation before the effects are noted.
77. See Riordan Roett, Brazil's Protracted Transition to Democracy and the Market, in
Post-Stabilization Politics in Latin America 199 (Carol Wise & Riordan Roett eds.,
2003) (providing a counter-example to Chile's experience).
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C. INCREASED NEED FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION
AND GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION
Opening an economy to international trade inevitably disadvantages
certain segments of society. If sufficient income inequality exists, the dis-
advantaged groups have little to lose by creating disruptions and may po-
tentially take solace in the problems they have caused to other groups.
78
As such, governments must be prepared to compensate these groups in
an effort to reach an agreement and prevent social conflict. Easing the
economic hardships encountered as a result of lost jobs and economic
uncertainty usually requires additional social protection programs, an
idea known as the compensation hypothesis. 79 But expanding social ser-
vices (and often the size of the public sector) requires additional govern-
ment spending. When economic growth rates are low or the country in
question is burdened by debt or other macro-economic concerns, any ad-
ditional government spending may well be impracticable.
D. EXTERNAL GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Finally, other geopolitical concerns may claim primacy over domestic
conditions in trade negotiations. Economic and banking crises, and the
subsequent reforms that IMF intervention usually mandates, may have a
more significant effect on trade liberalization than other domestic fac-
tors.80 Other foreign aid and loan agreements may be linked to particular
issue areas covered by a trade agreement, and can exert a substantial ef-
fect. In these cases, the benefits of financial market development are un-
likely to trump these considerations in the negotiating process.
In addition, the difference in market size and development levels
within Latin America also makes it difficult to achieve the level of eco-
nomic integration required under the FTrAA. In many cases, smaller
agreements such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR are easier to accomplish.
Similarly, increased participation in the WTO by many Latin American
nations diminishes the perceived need for an additional regional agree-
ment and diverts policy-makers attention. The myriad range and degree
of geopolitical concerns are not inconsequential, and have the potential
to outweigh any effects generated by financial market development.
While the above concerns have the potential to overshadow financial
market development in trade policy, it is worthwhile to note that the posi-
tive effects of financial development extend well beyond serving as a jus-
tification for a new trade agreement. Even when eclipsed by more
78. Mark I. Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (1995).
79. Rodrik, Iverson, and Katzenstein discuss the relationship between economic open-
ness and the size of government. Rodrik, supra note 16; Torben Iverson, The Dy-
namics of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization, and Partisan Politics, in
The New Politics of the Welfare State (Paul Pierson ed., 2001); Peter J. Katzen-
stein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (1985).
80. Stallings and Kaufman examine the effects of Latin American debt crises and sub-
sequent World Bank, IMF and U.S. foreign policy responses. Debt and Democ-
racy in Latin America (Barbara Stallings & Robert Kaufman eds., 1989).
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immediate concerns, the economic and institutional improvements that
result from more developed financial markets may still play a supporting
role in trade liberalization by facilitating overall national development.
VI. CONCLUSION-GOOD DOMESTIC POLICY
IS GOOD TRADE POLICY
Regardless of the ultimate fate of the FTAA, increasing economic inte-
gration in the Americas is likely to continue. This integration presents
many opportunities for economic development in Latin America, but en-
suring an even distribution of costs and benefits requires a solid domestic
institutional structure that can withstand the pressures of trade liberaliza-
tion. Although many of the issues that plague the FTAA are complex
and defy easy solutions, policies that support financial market develop-
ment within a nation may eliminate some of the barriers to the FTAA by
creating the social and economic conditions most conducive to harvesting
the potential benefits from trade liberalization while minimizing the costs
(and opposition) associated with participation. Thus, policies that sup-
port financial market development might be characterized as a develop-
ment "bonus buy," and provide a single approach to both overall
development and trade negotiation.
Poverty reduction, greater income equality, institutional improvements,
and decreased corruption are common goals for all nations, regardless of
trade status. Without improvements in these areas, conditions of relative
deprivation, low human capital levels, and economic stagnation can result
in serious social conflict. Given that social unrest often has substantial
economic consequences (in the form of capital flight and reduced foreign
investment, for example), financial market development policies that
avert these conditions are a cost-effective way of mitigating conflict.81 As
some of the economic concerns of society are alleviated, there may be
greater support from groups who stand to benefit from trade and less
resistance (from lower uncertainty and improved economic standing)
from groups that are traditionally disadvantaged by trade liberalization.
Strong domestic financial markets also serve as a hedge against global
risks, further insulating the vulnerable population against negative
shocks.
Greater economic and institutional development may also create a new
set of stakeholders with an interest in free trade. As more of the popula-
tion moves into the middle class, and as businesses become increasingly
viable in the global marketplace, the demand for access to other markets
will increase. When combined with better institutional representation
that reflects these new demands, greater freedom for policy-makers to
negotiate and sign free trade agreements will result.
81. See Alberto Alesina et al., Political Instability and Economic Growth, 1 J. Econ.
Growth 189 (1996) (a discussion on the economic effects of social instability); Al-
berto Alesina & R. Roberto Perotti, Income Distribution, Political Instability, and
Investment, 60 Eur. Econ. Rev. 755 (1996).
CAN THE FTAA BE REVIVED?
Furthermore, financial development may result in lower adjustment
and compliance costs for entering an FTA by improving the domestic reg-
ulatory environment. 82 The technological innovation and product com-
petitiveness that results from an efficient allocation of investment means
that industries are familiar with, and likely in compliance with, interna-
tional standards. This may eliminate the need for the graduated policies
and industry protection that have plagued previous negotiations. In addi-
tion, compliance with international best practices and high quality regula-
tion may alleviate some of the concerns over intellectual property rights
protection, a particularly contentious area of dispute. Further aug-
menting this effect, the reduced incentives for fraudulent behavior and
lower corruption levels serve as further evidence of a partner nations'
commitment to rights protection.
The potential gains from trade often greatly outweigh the costs, and
provide a strong impetus for reviving the FTAA negotiations. Creating
the conditions conducive to a trade agreement, however, will require
both domestic development and time. Trade agreements will stagnate
without good institutions, and a nation will lose its appetite (and commit-
ment) to free trade if benefits are not realized within a relatively short
time period. It is imperative that policy-makers create the best possible
conditions to ensure that the predicted gains occur. The Free Trade Area
of the Americas can help achieve the economic growth sought by many
Latin American nations, but unless the domestic capacity of a country is
strengthened to alleviate some of the opposition to further trade liberali-
zation, the FTAA is likely to fail before it begins. Ultimately, trade
agreements must support development goals, not substitute for them.
82. Finger & Schuler, supra note 37 (further discussing compliance costs).
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APPENDIX A
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
" GDP Growth - Change in annual gross domestic product (Source:
World-Bank (2006). World Development Indicators (WDI). Washing-
ton, D.C.)
• GDP Per Capita - Total per capita GDP (Source: WDI)
" Poverty - Percentage of the population living on less than $2 per day.
A higher values indicates greater poverty. (Source: WDI)
" Inequality - Calculated Gini value of income inequality. Higher val-
ues indicate greater income inequality (Source: WDI)
" Corruption - Annual perceived corruption survey score. Here,
higher values indicate greater transparency, or decreasing corrup-
tion. (Source: Kaufman, D., A. Kraay, et al. (2003). "Governance
Matters IV: New Data, New Challenges." The World Bank. Wash-
ington , D.C.)
" Governmental Effectiveness - Calculated based on survey responses
to the quality of public service, the competence of bureaucrats, and
the independence of civil service decision making from political pres-
sure. Higher values indicate greater satisfaction with government.
(Source: Governance Matters IV)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
* Financial Market Development - Amount of private credit (exclud-
ing government lending and state banks) as a percentage of total
GDP. (Source: Demirguc-Kunt, A. and R. Levine, Eds. (2001). Fi-
nancial Structure and Economic Growth. Cambridge, The MIT
Press.)
CONTROL VARIABLES
" Democracy Level - Standardized Polity Score measuring institu-
tional indicators of democracy. (Source: Gurr, T. R., M. G. Marshall,
et al. (2006). "Polity IV Dataset." www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity)
" Foreign Direct Investment - Net FDI inflows as a percentage of total
GDP (Source: WDI)
" Inflation - Annual change in consumer prices (Source: WDI)
" Debt - Government debt as a percentage of total GDP (Source:
WDI)
* Trade - Annual trade volume as a percentage of total GDP (Source:
WDI)
" Population - natural logged value of total population (Source: WDI)
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